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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
FRANK J. ALLEN,
Pldilntijf and Appellant,

Case No.
7367

vs.
SOUTHERN P kCIFIC COMPANY,
Defendmnt and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATE·MENT
In the case now before this court, appellant Allen,
(plaintiff below) seeks to recover the very substantial
sum of Two Thousand One Hundred and Ninety ($2,190.00) Dollars for 10 cents paid respondent as consideration for checking appellant's bag. The appellant's
complaint alleged, and the court found, that on September 10, 1947, at Portland, Oregon, appellant delivered
to respondent, at its station parcel room, appellant's
forty-seven dollar bag, containing expensive jewelry,
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high priced clothing, (including two suits and a top coat,
each valued by appellant at some $85, and a wool shirt
valued at $22.50), a radio, a Parker pen set, valued at
$65, a 20-30 revolver, and other items. The court found
that at the time of the said delivery, appellant was en
route from Portland to Pocatello, Idaho, and as· therespondent's parcel room was at the railroad station, it can
be safely inferred that appellant was then travelling to
Idaho on an interstate train. The court further found
the following significant facts. The parcel check given
appellant upon deposit of his bag had on one side, in
large type, the word ''NOTICE,'' followed by a stated
limitation of respondent's liability not to exceed $25
"for loss of, damage or delay to, any parcel" unless the
customer then declared and paid for a greater sum. ·Oii
the reverse side of this parcel check given to appellant
were these words, in large print:
"DATE AND TIME DELIVERED. FOR
EXCESS LIABILITY· s·EE NOTICE ON OPPOSITE SIDE."

(

I

Then followed the storage rate of 10 cents for each 24
hours. The court also found that respondent, at the time
of the delivery of the bag, had posted at its parcel roolm
"where it was visible to pla'rimti[f," (Italics ours), a sign
upon which appeared the following words in large, plain
print.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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''Protect Your
PARCELS
Our Liability for Loss or Damage is
Limited to
$25.00
"Greater value n1ay be declared at time of
checking upon payment of 10 cents for each additional $25.00 value or fraction thereof.
''Parcels or articles exceeding $250.00 in
value not accepted.''
The appellant admitted in his reply, that he never
declared any value for his bag or iPcontents, and there is
no finding that respondent or its agents ever knew of
that value, or what the bag contained.
Respondent, in Paragraph 5 of its second an1ended
answer to plaintiff's complaint, alleged that any delivery
to defendant of any article, including the alleged Sampsonite bag, was at all times subject to the terms and conditions written on the claim check and the posted notice.
Planti:ff's reply denied those allegations. The final pleadings of both parties and the exact form and wording of
the claim check and posted notice are fully set out in
appellant's brief, and therefore do not here need to be
repeated verbatim. Respondent would, however, like to
call the court's attention to two very important items
in its said answer and the said claim check and posted
notice. First, the limitations of value there set forth
were not a flat, or fixed limitation of liability, but provided for a declaration of value by the customer, and a
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charge made by respondent according to this declared
value. For the first 10 cents paid to check a bag, the customer received liability coverage from respondent up
to $25. The customer could receive further coverage
upon payment of 10 cents for each additional $25 of value
or fraction thereof declared. Respondent, by the terms of
the parcel check and the posted notice, also gave notice
that it would not accept articles exceeding $250.00 ill
value.
Second, in the last two paragraphs of section numbered 5 of respondent's amended answer, respondent
alleged that ''plaintiff then and there had notice of said
provisions and terms of the said parcel check and posted
notice above set forth''; and further alleged ''that plaintiff did not at the alleged time of his making the alleged
delivery and deposit of said bag, nor at any other time
mentioned in said complaint, make any declaration of
value as to said bag or its contents nor pay the additional
charge required in case of value in .excess of $25.00.''
In his reply, appellant alleged that he was without
notice of the terms of the claim check. He admitted as
above stated, that he made no declaration of value or paid
to respondent anything beyond the original charge of
10 cents. He denied, in the reply, all of the respondent's
allegations as to the posted notice, including its presence
and that it was, at the time and place in question, plainly
visible.
Appellant has seen fit to make his appeal without
placing- before this court the evidence presented below.
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The court therefore has only the pleadings, findings, conclusions and judgment of the lower court to consider.,
That court, sitting without a jury, and after hearing all
of the testimony and viewing the evidence, concluded
that, though respondent was liable for the loss of appellant's bag and contents, its liability 'vas limited by contract between the parties to Twenty-five ($25.00) Dollars.
Respondent submits that the judgment of the lower
court is correct, and that upon the record before this
court, that judgment must be affirmed.

ARGUMENT
I

THE SO-CALLED CONCLUSION OF LAW OF
THE LOWER COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT'S
LIABILITY WAS LIMITED BY CONTRACT TO A
SUM OF NOT TO EXCEED TWENTY-FIVE ($25.00)
DOLLARS IS ACTUALLY A FINDING OF FACT
WHICH CONTROLS THIS CASE AND CANNOT
HERE BE DISTURBED ON APPEAL
As repeatedly stated by this court, its only concern,
where the appeal is on the judgment roll, is whether the
pleadings, findings of fact and conclusions of law support the judgment. Gray vs. Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 Pac.
2d 251; and SandJaU vs. Hoskins, 104 Utah 50, 137 Pac.
2d 819.
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Respondent respectfully submits that the court below was correct in limiting its judgn1ent for plaintiff to
the amount of $25. This judgment is based not only upon
the fact that respondent, by having the printed notice on
the ticket (set forth in the court's finding of fact No.5)
and by posting the notice (set out in finding No.6), limited the amount that plaintiff might recover, but also
upon the conclusion, or finding, of the court that "the
extent of defendant's liability for such loss was by contract limited to the sum of not to exceed Twenty-five
( $25.00) Dollars." Here we have a definite and specific
statement by the court that such a contract between the
parties existed. The result is no different because the
court called this statement a conclusion of law instead
of a finding of fact. The distinction between a finding of
fact and conclusion of law is a mere formality and, as this
court has held, does not determine the nature of the statement. Dunoan v. Hemmelwright, 186 Pac. 2d 965, ....
Utah ........, citing Sanfiall vs. Hoskins, supra. Respondent,
moreover, contends that the existence or nonexistence of
a contract is an ultimate fact. This court has so held. In
the recent case of .Sandall vs Hoskins, supra, the lower
court made the finding of fact, as stated with approval
by this court, ''that the parties agreed that the lessees
should have all of the rents ..., and that the grazing
rights were not reserved to the lessor.'' This court held
that this conclusion was a finding of fact, ''especially
in view that it sets out the basis for the conclusion
reached.'' In our case, the existence· of the contract is
the ultimate fact which is supported by the lower court's
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finding that defendant had printed on the clai1n check
a notice of limitation, and had posted at the time and
place of the delivery of plaintiff's bag, a printed sign,
visible to plaintiff, giving notice of the stated limitation
of liability. Again, in Gna.y vs. Defa, supra, this court
classified as a finding the conclusion of the lower court
''that defendants had forfeited all rights under the various agreements.'' So here, respondent again stresses
that, the so-called "conclusion of law" that the liability of
defendant was limited by contract, is in truth an ultimate
fact. As this court has ruled, findings should contain
only such ultimate facts and not detailed subsidiary facts
upon which the ultimate fact is based. Dwnoan vs. Hemmelzrright, supra. If this court concludes that the lower
court's statement as to the existence of a contract is a
conclusion of law, that statement, however, still forms
the basis of the judgment. In another Utah decision,
Homer vs. Oregon Short LineR. R., 42 Utah 15, 128 Pac.
522, this court ruled that the effect of conditions contained in the ticket, and the rules and regulations governing the care of baggage (as filed with the I. C. C.) '' ... was
entirely for the court, and, although they had been expressly admitted in evidence, the result, so far as it affected appellant's liability, would still have been the same
as a matter of law.''
The Colorado case of French vs. Bekins M oV'ing &
Storage Co., 195 Pac. 2d 968, approved of the trial court's
finding that the defendant "was liable upon a contractual
limitation of ten cents per pound ... (which) necessarily i1nplies a finding that plaintiff did knowingly asSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sent to the ten cent limitation, and supports that finding." In Geo·rge, et al, vs. Bekins Van & Storage Co., et
al, 205 P. 2d 1037, the California court observed that "the
trial court found that plaintiff never agreed to the declared value.'' The above decisions all agree that it is
the prerogative of the trial court to find whether an
agreement of limitation was made between the parties.
In our own situation, that is exactly what the lower court
did.
The established rule of this court is that it is required, in the absence of a bill of exceptions, to assume
that the findings of the lower court are supported by the

i

Re.alty GJYI)d Construction Company, 102 Utah 523, 129

I

Pac. 2d 981. In the Gray case this court commented as

j

follows: ''We would therefore ordinarily assume that the

(

finding of the court that defendants had ·forfeited all

I

evidence. Gro;y vs. De fa, supra and 0 'Gorman vs. Utah

rights under the various agreements and the contract
of sale was supported by the evidence.'' That appeal was
upon the judgment roll only. The wording just quoted
has a striking application to the case now before the
court. This court must assume, in the absence of any
evidence, that the lower court was correct in deciding that
a contract existed between respondent and appellant
limiting appellant's liability not to exceed $25. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota among others, also holds
that the appellate court cannot disregard the lower
court's findings and substitute i•ts own. Joyce vs. JanesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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9
'rille, 155 N. ,V. 1067, L.R.A. 1916D, 426. In accord, see
Scott 'l'S. Ford, (Ore.) 78 Pac. 742, and Vol. 3'Amcrioan
Juris pntd ence, Page 462.

Paragraph 7 of the lower court's finding states that
the defendant did not see or read the posted sign or the
printing on the parcel check, and that the plaintiff had
no lmowledge of any limitation of liability by defendant,
but nothing in the findings of the court negatives the
proposition that plaintiff had notice in the legal sense
of the word of such limitation through the obvious
printed matter on the parcel check and the posted notice,
which notice the court found "was visible to plaintiff
as he checked his said bag.'' Nothing in the findings precludes any ultimate finding that the contract of limitation
existed.
It is true that some parts of the findings may appear
inconsistent or ambiguous. If such is the case, the courts
held that any inconsistency or ambiguity will be construed to support the judgment. See Hotaling vs. Hotaling (Cal.) 224 Pac. 455, 56 A.L.R. 734. V10lunteer State
Life InsuratYtCe Oompany vs. Richardson (Tenn.) 244 S.
W. 44,26 A.L.R.1270; and Chase vs. Hifnckley (Wis.) 105
N.W. 230. As stated in Volume 3 American Jurisprudence Page 463 : ''In other words ambiguous findings will
be given a construction which will support the judgment,
rather than one which will require its reversal.'' Respondent therefor submits that the statement of the
lower court that defendant's liability was by contract
limited to $25 is a finding conclusive upon this court and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cures any defect elsewhere appearing in the court's findings.
II
A LIMITATION OF LIABILITY IN THIS CASE
IS NOT CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY AND W.NS
AND IS EFFECTIVE TO LIMIT LIABILITY FOR
RESPONDENT'S LOSS OF APPELLANT'S PROPERTY.
Appellant contends, in his first point of argument,
that the limitation of liability as set forth in the parcel
check arid the posted notice referred to in the findings
of fact is contrary to public policy and hence void. In
appellant's second point he contends that in any event,
such a limitation is ineffective to limit liability for any
conversion of plaintiff's property by defendant. The
third point argued by appellant is that the limitation
must have been accepted by him, and that "no acceptance
is shown.'' His fourth point is that the wording of this
particular limitation does not cover the type of loss now
under consideration. These points 3:re so closely related,
and the various decisions so intermingle with them, that
respondent will discuss all of them together. Later in the
brief respondent will consider appellant's points three
and four again, but separately.
It must be kept in mind at all times throughout the
consideration of our problem, that we are concerned with
a limitation which varies in amount in direct proportion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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11
to the value declared and the charge paid by the bailor or
shipper, and not with a limitation that either attempts
to exempt a bailor from liability, or sets a fixed and flat
limit regardless of any declared value. Appellant's cases
are concerned with this last type of limitation, and hence
do not apply to the instant case.
Let us see whether the courts and laws of the different jurisdictions support appellant's arguments.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Boston
& Maitn R. R. vs. Booker, 233 U.S. 97, 58 L. Ed., 868, decided in 1913, passed upon a Federal Statute regulating,
among other things the shipping of baggage. This statute
with certain amendments, is now 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6 (1).
At the time this case arose, the statute (24 Stat. 380,
as amended by 34 Stat. 586, Chap. 3591, provided:
''That every common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act shall file with the Commission created by this act, and print and keep open
to public inspection, schedules showing all the
rates, fares, and charges for transportation. . . .
The schedules printed as aforesaid by and such
common carrier . . . shall also state separately
all terminal charges, storage charges, icing
charges, and all other charges which the Commission may require, all privileges or facilities
granted or allowed, and any rules or regulations
which in anywise change, affect, or determine any
part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates,
fares, and charges, or the value of the service
rendered to the passenger, shipper, or consignee.
Such schedules shall be plainly printed in large
type, and copies for the use of the public shall be
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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kept posted in two p.ublic and ~onspicuous pla~es
in every depot, statwn, or off1ce of such carrier
where passengers or freight, respectively, are received for transportation, in such form that they
shall be accessible to the public, and can be conveniently inspected. The provisions of this seetion shall apply to all traffic, transportation, and
facilities defined in this chapter.''
The suit was for loss, through negligence, o.f plaintiff's
hand bag while in the custody of defendant at its station.
The loss occurred some twenty-six hours after the trip
had ended. The lower court found that the carrier had
filed'its schedules of rates with the Interstate Commerce
Commission. These schedules limited liability to $100
and provided as follows: ''For excess value the rate will
be one-half of the current excess baggage rate per 100
pounds for each $100 of increased value declared ... "
''Baggage liability is limited to personal baggage
not to exceed $100 . . . unless a greater value is declared
and stipulated by the owner and existing charges thereon
paid at time of checking the baggage.'' The lower court
further found· that the railroad had notices posted "in
the baggage room of the station, in a conspicuous place,
and in sight of persons using the room for checking baggage'' and containing information with reference to excess weight. But no ticket or posted notice referred to
a declaration of value, or any value limit, which were
contained only in the schedule. The lower court also
found that plaintiff did not declare that her baggage
exceeded $100 in value nor pay any charges for excess
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Yaluation. No bill of lading, baggage check or other receipt is here involved. The only ticket was the passenger's
railroad ticket under which plaintiff had checked his
baggage. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment
of the ~!assachusetts court which had held the limitation
invalid. The Supreme Court also held that the fact that
the plaintiff had no knowledge of the regulations limiting liability and that the railroad had not inquired as to
the value, was immaterial. The Court quoted from
Adams Exp. Co. vs. Groninger, 226 U. S. 509, 57 L. Ed.
314, 321, as follows: ''The knowledge of the shipper that
the rate was based upon the value is to be presumed from
the terms of the bill of lading and of the published schedules.'' The court cited and quoted from Kams1as (]lity

So. R. Co. vs. Carl, 227 U.S. 640, 57 L. Ed. 683, 688:
''The valuation the shipper declares determines the legal rate where there are two rates
based upon valuation. He must take notice of
the rate applicable, and actual want of knowledge
is no excuse. The rate, when made out and filed,
is notice, and its effect is not lost, although it
is not actually posted in the station. (Citing
cases). It would open a wide doo'r to frawd and
destroy the uniform operation of the published
tariff rate sheets. When there are two published
rates, based upon difference in value, the legal
rate automatically attaches itself to the declared
or agreed value. Neither the intentional nor accidental misstatement of the applicable published
rate will bind the carrier or shipper." (Italics
ours)
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The following statement from New y,ork C. & H.R.R. Co·.
vs. Fr-alof/, 100 U.S. 24, 25 L. Ed. 531, is quoted by the
U.S. Supreme Court in the above Boston & M~ain R. R. Co.
decision:
''And in order that such regulations may
be practically effective and the carrier advised
of the full extent of its responsibility, and, consequently, of the degree of precaution necessary upon
its part, it may rightfully require, as a condition precedent to any contract for the transportation of baggage, information from the passenger
as to its value; and if the value thus disclosed
exceeds that which the passenger may reasonably demand to be transported as baggage without extra compensation the carrier, at its option,
can make such additional charges as the risk
fairly justifies.''
The Boston decision also cited M K T R Company vs.
Harriman, 227 U.S. 699, 57 L. Ed. 690, to the eff·ect that
the shipper was compelled to take notice of rate sheets
not only because referred to in the contract signed by
them, but because they had been lawfully filed and published. '' ' ... the shipper must take notice, for the valuation automatically determines which of the rates is the
lawful rate.' '' The Boston & M~ain opinion ruled that
the contract between the shipper and carrier is not the
bill of lading alone but all the schedules and tariffs,
and also stated a principle which can very well be applied
to our instant case: ''A common carrier may prescribe
regulations to protect himself against imposition and
fraud and fix a rate charge proportionate to the amount
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of the risk he may be put to incur." The decision does
not distinguish between losses through conversion of the
property and through other means, and holds that a
recovery may not be had beyond the amount stipulated
even though the loss results from the carrier's negligence. The decision cited other Supreme Court cases,
including Hart vs. P. R. R. Co., 112 U.S. 331, 28 L. Ed.
717, in support of this rule. The Court commented that
this is the New York ruling, and cites a number of New
York decisions.
That case is of added significance in considering our
question because the federal statute there discussed
makes no reference to the type of notice required to be
given. It does not state whether or not the notice is
to be actual or whether the shipper must know of or
''acquiesce'' in the limitation. Mr. Samuel Williston,
who argued the cause for the shipper, contended, to no
avail, that the carrier must prove ''assent'' of the shipper to the limitation, and that its terms ''must be brought
home to him.'' The Supreme Court rejected this contention and ruled that the Massachusetts court committed
error in requiring such proof.
Even though this court may finally decide that the
present case is not within the federal statute considered
in the Supreme Court decisions which respondent cites,
those decisions, are, by analogy, excellent authority for
respondent's 1arguments. State court decisions, including
those of Oregon, so consider them to be. For example,
the following Supreme Court decisions are in point.
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In N.Y.C.R. Co. vs. Beham, 242 U. S. 148, 61 L. Ed.
210, plaintiff claimed that she did not read the baggage
receipt, and the Missouri court ruled that defendant must
show that plaintiff expressly consented to the limitation.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that, "the acceptance and
w~e of the ticket sufficed to establish an agreement prima
facie valid which limited the carrier's liability. Mere
failure to read the matter plainly placed before her could
not overcome the presumption of assent.'' The Court
laid down the above rule without any refer·ence to tariff
schedules or the Federal Statute. In fact, the schedules
had not been considered by the lower court. In the case
now under review the lower court found that appellant,
Allen, accepted -and used the ticket with the limitation
thereon, and the court found that the contract limiting
liability was thereby created. No evidence is now before

1

this court which would tend to overcome the '' presumption of assent."

f

Our United States Supreme Court has well summarized the rule respecting limitations of liability in
Steamship Ans,aldo vs. Rheinstrom Bros. Co., 294 U. S.
494, 79 L. Ed. 1016. The decision itself involved a limitation unlike the one now before this court, because the
shipper had not been offered a choice of rates, and the
value was set by the carrier as shown in the invoice. The
lower court commissioner found that there was no choice
of rates offered according to the value placed upon the
goods. The opinion cited with approval the above SuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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preme Court cases and commented upon a limitation such
as ours in the following language:
"Two so-called valuation clauses have been
in frequent use. One is a true limitation agreement. It recites that a sum named on the bill of
lading is the agreed value of the goods, or their
value per unit or per package, in the absence of
the shipper's declaration of a higher value; that
the rate is fixed with reference to the specified
value, and if a greater be declared a higher rate
will apply; that in consideration of the rate to
be charged, the carrier's liability for loss or damage shall be limited to the stipulated value . . .
Agreements of this kind are held to he reasonable
and not offensive to the public policy against contracts relieving the carrier from its own negligence. The agreement as to value in consideration of carriage at the lower rate thus obtained
is held· to estop the shipper from demanding
damages in excess of the agreed value.''
In referring to a limitation of liability and a bill
of lading whereby the shipper and carrier agree on the
value of the goods at the time of shipment, and even
though no choice of rates is offered the shipper, the
opinion commented that "the weight of authority in
the state courts seems to be in favor of upholding the
clause even though no such choice is open to the shipper."
Decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court concerning the
terms of a free railroad pass are also, by analogy, pertinent to our case. Those decisions uniformly hold that
a person accepting a pass in interstate commerce from
a carrier is bound by the terms thereon even though the
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passenger does not read the terms or know of them. The
carrier may, by stipulations contained in such a pass,
exempt itself from responsibility for negligence without
violating public policy. Kans~as City Railway Oompwny
vs. Van Za.nt, 260 U.S. 459, 67 L. Ed. 348; Boering vs.
Ohesa.peake Beach R·ailway OompaffiJY, 193 U.S. 442, 48

L. Ed. 742.
This court, in considering a bailment made in Oregon, will give full consideration to the decisions and laws
of that state. In fact, the validity, interpretation and
effect of a contract, whether of bailment or otherwise is
'
controlled by the lex loci cont'f1actus. Crofaot vs. That..
cher, 19 U. 212, 57 Pac. 171. Let us review the opinions
of the 'Supreme Court of Oregon. In No·rmlile vs. Oregon
R. & NaL·. Co., 69 Pac. 928, the court passed upon the
validity of a bill of lading which provided a declaration
of value as follows:
" 'that the said company has this day received from the shipper ... two head of mules
to be transported . . . at the rate of (so much)
per head, which is less than the tariff rate for
the tranportation of livestock at carrier's risk and
is given said shipper in part consideration of his
agreement to the limitation of the liability said
company as common carrier, ... And it is hereby further agreed that the value of the livestock to
be transported under this contract does not exceed the following mentioned sum ... each mule
$100'. "
The uncontroverted evidence was that the shipper
knew nothing of the price of shipment or the rate. At
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the tilne he took the goods to the carrier's dock, the
defendant's agent produced a shipping receipt and told
him to sign, which he did. Neither pla.inti.jf nor his agent
read the bill of Zadin.g or rece!ipt or knew its contents.
The Oregon court reversed the lower court's judgment
for plaintiff, and held that the bill of lading was not contrary to public policy. "It can make no difference
whether the valuation expressed in the contract is one
previously named by the shipper on requirement of the
carrier, or one inserted in the contract by the carrier
without being named by the shipper, but acquiesced
in by him. In either case, it becomes a part of the contract, on which the minds of the parties meet, and on
which they act... '' It is important to note that the
evidence there was that plaintiff's mule was injured
through defendant's negligence committed in unloading
the mule. The opinion contains a long discussion of the
distinction between a carrier's attempt to exempt itself
from full or partial liability, and a stipulation as to
value.
"Plaintiff cannot consistently claim a higher
valuation upon the agreed rate of freight, and
the contract is not, in any proper sense, one for
the exemption of defendant from the consequences
of negligence ... Such stipulations and contracts
are supported and upheld upon considerations of
fairness, as they relate both to the shipper and
the carrier. We .are led to this concl!usion by oases
of palpable analogy and high a.uthor+ity. Indeed,
there are but few 'O'pposed." (Italics ours).
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The court then cited the U.S. Supreme Court case of
Hart vs. Ra.i.lro~ad Co. supra, and other decisions in support of its opinion. Another point in favor of respondent here is that the court held that the Oregon trial
court committed error in leaving the question to the jury
''whether there was any consideration in the way of a
lower or less than ordinary rate for a limitation of the
defendant's liability for negligence as to such (livestock)." The plaintiff, in his complaint, had attempted
to recover upon the common law liability of a carrier
for damage or loss through its negligence. The Oregon
court ruled that he was not so entitled to recover, "having entered into a special contract relative to the utmost
value of the animal injured.'' In our case, the lower
court found that the respondent had made a valid contract of limitation with plaintiff, and this court must
assume that competent and sufficient evidence existed
to support such a result.
Another Oregon decision illustrating the point that
that state does not consider limitations of liability by
a carrier in violation of public policy is Goldstein vs.

Robert Dollar Co., 270 Pac. 903. While the facts are not
directly in point, in that the bill of lading in question was
sent to the shipper some ten days after he had delivered
the goods to the carrier, the observations of the court
and the rulings on certain matters of laws are important. There, defendant claimed that the plaintiff's acceptance of the bill of lading without objection precluded
him from disputing its terms. The court observed that
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defendant's position ·would have been much more favorable ''if the issuance of the bill of lading had been contemporaneous with the delivery of the automobile.'' The
court ruled that the point whether plaintiff assented to
the terms of the bill of lading was a question of fact for
the jury. In applying this ruling to our case, the lower
court, in the place of a jury, must be held to have found
that such assent existed in order to find that a contract
was made between the parties, and it is not for this
court to revise that finding.
Approving the Normile vs. Oregon R. & N·av. Co.
case, supra, is Voyt vs. Bekins Moving & Storrage Co.,
119 Pac. 2d 586, rehearing denied, 127 P. 2d 360. There,
a warehouse receipt was the subject of discussion. The
receipt was mailed to the bailor (plaintiff) about two
weeks after the goods were delivered to defendant. The
plaintiff had never signed it and, in fact, had never seen
it until it was delivered in the mail. The receipt stated
that the limit of liability was $10 per 100 lbs. The defendant, in the lower court, never proved that these
storage charges were fixed on the basis of the agreed
limitation. An additional fact stressed by the court is
that defendant's agent knew when the trunk was delivered
to defendant that it contained silver and was therefore of
value much in excess of the stated limit. "The crucial
element in the case at bar is the fact of the actual knowledge communicated to the warehouse concerning the
identity and substantial value of the silver." The court
also pointed out that the wording of the limitation was
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"ambiguous in that it did not clearly show that the rate
charged was based on the $10 limitation.'' That action
was based upon the theory of negligence, and the court
did not make any distinction between that form of suit
and any other type of suit for the recovery of the value
of lost or damaged goods. In fact, the decision cited
and quoted from an Ohio case, Centffial St.or,age Warehouse Co. vs. Pickering, 151 N. E. 39, which was an action
in trover, alleging negligence. In that case, as the Oregon court comments, the receipt was signed only by the
warehouseman but it was delivered at the time the goods
were received in storage.
The V oyt case approved the Normile case, as follows:
''The trial court was apparently of the opinion that a stipulation as to the agreed value of
goods is void if the goods were lost through the
negligence of the warehouseman. If the court
intended to and did so instruct it was ·error. Under
the Normile oase ·a valid contrtactual provis~on
as to 1agff'eed value fairly arrived at is binding
notwithsbanding the negligent loss of the goods
by the defendant." (Italics ours).
This is the most recent word of the Oregon court
on this subject. The decision also gives to a warehouseman greater bargaining rights· than to a common carrier
but because of the ''specific facts in the case,'' the court
affirmed the judgment for plaintiff.
The Or.egon statute applied in the V oyt case is
known as the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. Vol.
4, O.C.L.A., Section 60~203 of that act provides that
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a warehouseinan n1ay insert in a receipt ''any other
terms and conditions provided that such terms and conditions shall not impair his obligation to exercise that
degree of care . . . which a reasonably careful man would
exercise in regard to similar goods of his own.'' The
Yoyt opinion states that the better view supports a limitation of liability" 'if the requisites for the formation of
a contract are satisfied,' " citing and quoting 4 Willist:on
on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Page 2927. On rehearing in the
r oyt case, the Oregon Supreme Court again stated the
rule "that parties may make a binding contract concerning the value of the goods bailed and which will be
effective even in the event of negligence.''
A further difference between that Oregon decision
and our present case is that the reviewing court had before
it all of the trial testimony, and, therefore, had a basis
for determining the question whether the elements of a
binding contract of limitation were present under the
circumstances.
The Oregon court, upon its opinion rendered on the
rehearing of the V oyt case, 127 Pac. 2d 360, at page 364,
also made this pertinent observation:
''If this were a case in which a schedule of
rates showing a basic rate and the higher charges
made for higher valuations appeared upon the
receipt or was on file pursuant to law, a different
situation would arise.''
In the case now before this court, that is exactly what we
have: a schedule of rates and higher charges for higher
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valuations appearing upon the receipt and filed pursuant
to law. The dissent of the three judges in the V oyt opinion on rehearing shows the invalidity of the appellant's
argument here that his lack of knowledge of the contents of the baggage check or parcel check and the posted
notice should preclude his being bound by the limitation.
This opinion cited and quoted from Williston and other
authorities, including a statement by Justice Learned
Hand of the New York court, as follows:
" 'A contract is an obligation attached by
the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany
and ·represent a known intent. If, however, it were
proved ... that either party ... intended something else than the usual meaning which the law
imposes upon (the words), he would still be held
unless there were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.' ''
The V oyt opinion quoted from Williston on Contracts, as follows:
" 'It follows from the principle that manifested mutual assent rather than actual mental
assent is the essental element in the formation of
contracts, that a mistaken idea of one or both parties in regard to the meaning of an offer or acceptance will not prevent the formation of a contract.' ''
In the instant case, we have a fair notice not only
posted and visible to the plaintiff, as found by the court,
but we have a baggage check containing a notice of
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limitation of value. 'Ye have no finding by the trial
court that plaintiff did not assent, in the legal sense of the
word, to the terms, nor do we have a finding which negatiYes notice given by defendant. On the contrary, we have
the court's finding, there called a conclusion, that a
contract existed to fix the value of the plaintiff's bag
delivered to defendant, and there being no evidence
before this court, it must abide by that finding.
The Oregon court, in the Voyt decision, also cited
and quoted with approval the California case of Englarnd
vs. Lyon Fireproof Storag,e Company, 271 Pac. 532,
wherein plaintiff bailor sued the defendant warehouse for
negligent loss of certain goods. The receipt provided
that responsibility of the defendant '' 'is limited to the
sum of $25, unless the value thereof is made known at the
time of the storing, and receipted for in the schedule,
and an additional charge made for the higher valuation

. . . ' '' No evidence existed that the bailor made any
declaration of value, but the lower California court found
that the defendant knew the contents of some of the
crates but not others. The appellate court ruled that
the limitation controlled as to the articles "whos·e identity and value were unknown to the defendant.'' This
California decision cited Williston on Contracts, Vol. 4,
Rev. Ed. p. 2927, quoted again by the Oregon court, to
the effect that, "The better view supports such a limitation if the requisites for the formation of a contract
are satisfied. ' '
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Another California decision approved by the V oyt
case supra, is Donlon Br,os. vs. Southern Pacific Co., 91
Pac. 603. The Oregon court quoted from that California
opinion as follows:
'' 'A contract between a railroad company
and a shipper, reasonable and voluntarily entered
into by the parties, the primary purpose of which
was, as the rates of transportation charged by
the railroad were measured by the valuation of
the property shipped, to fix an agreed valuation
on such property as a basis upon which freight
rates should be charged and paid, on condition
that in case of loss the railroad's liability should
be measured by such agreed valuation, is to be
construed as an agreement fixing the valuation
of the property shipped, and not as a contract
limiting the liability of the railroad; arn.d in case
of loss through the gross negligence of t,he railroad, its liability cawnot exceed the v~alruation so
fixed.' " (Italics ours).
The above California court's classification of limitation such as ours as being not a real limitation of liability but an agreed or fixed valuation set by the parties,
is applied throughout the decisions, including the Voyt
case.
The California decision of Ge10rge, et ~al, vs. Bekins
Moving Van & Stor:age Company, 205 Pac. 2d 1037, reversing the District Court of Appeals, 196 Pac. 2d 637,
gives an excellent summary of the California decisions '
upon the limitations contained in warehouse receipts.
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There, the plaintiff delivered some goods to the defendant for storage and they were destroyed by fire through
defendant's negligence. The California statute, ( identical with Oregon) being Section 3 of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, reads as follows : ''A warehouseman
may insert in a receipt, issued by him, any other terms
and conditions, provided that such terms and conditions
shall not ... (b) In anywise impair his obligation to
exercise that degree of care in the safekeeping of the
goods entrusted to him which a reasonably careful man
would exercise in regard to similar goods of his own.''
The plaintiff, about a month after the delivery of the
goods, received a warehouse receipt by mail, which provided that the value of any article '' 'shall not exceed
$10 per 100 pounds unless the Depositor fixes a greater
value in writing at the time of the delivery thereof to
this Company and the same is receipted hereon, in
which event the Depositor agrees to pay an additional
charge therefor.' '' Before sending the goods to defendant, plaintiff had notified it the goods were valuable.
There is no evidence that plaintiff knew of the limitation
or declared value, or consented to it. This California
statute, says the court, ''should not be interpreted as restricting the right of contract as to an agreed valuation
of property for the purpose of fixing a responsibility
any further than it is restricted under the common law
rule. At common law such agreed valuation was not considered a limitation of liability for either ordinary or
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gross negligence.'' In holding the limitation binding,
the court commented as follows :
''In jurisdictions in this country where the
common-law rule obtains, it is the prevailing doctrine that there is a wide distinction between a
contract by a carrier providing for exemption
from liability for its negligence and a contra~t,
fairly entered into, whereby, in consideration of a
reduced rate of compensation for the transportation, the shipper and carrier agree upon a fixed
valuation therefor under which the responsibility of the carrier in case of loss shall be measured.
(Citing cases). The validity of such valuation
clauses does not depend on the relationship between the actual value and the stipulated value,
or on whether the carrier or bailee has knowledge
that the actual value is greater than the stipulated value.''
The opinion ruled that the California ease of EngZand
vs. Lyon Fire Proof Storage Company, supra, is, so far
as it holds that the declared value clause was invalid if
the bailee knew the actual value of the goods, ''not
in accord with the cas·es cited above and is disapproved."
In discussing the point whether a contract was made between the parties, the opinion stated:
''Ordinarily such assent (of the bailM.. to the
written contract) may be found in the aceeptance
or retention of the warehouse receipt by the
bailor." citing 1 Williston on Contracts (Rev.
Ed.) §90B, p. 266.
The court further held that the reduced rate at which
the goods were stored ''was adequate consideration for
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the limitation of liability . . . There is no indication
that had plaintiffs on receipt of the warehouse receipt
specified a higher value for their goods, that defendant
would not have charged them the higher rate for the
first month.'' The court modified the judgment by reducing plaintiff's recovery to the value set forth in the
bill of lading.
This court, in Homer vs. R·aivroad, 42 Utah 15, 128
Pac. 522, passed upon a case involving facts which could
be quite similar to those of the instant case. There, the
result of the alleged negligent acts of the defendant carrier in losing the plaintiff's trunk is comparable to the
finding in our case that defendant delivered the plaintiff's
bag to some unknown person. In the Homer case, a
stranger received permission from defendant's baggage
man to enter the baggage room for the stated purpose
of getting some things from his trunk, which was also
checked, and while there, intentionally exchanged his
baggage check with that on the plaintiff's trunk "and
in that way obtained the duplicate check for respondent's
trunk." The respective parties, on presentation of their
checks, received each other's baggage, and the stranger
stole the contents from plaintiff's trunk. The defendant's tariff schedules, filed pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Act, 24 Stat. L. 379, provided that 150 pounds
of '' 'personal baggage will be checked on each full ticket
and 75 pounds on each half ticket. Charge will be made
for excess weight in accordance with the following tariffs,
or succeeding issues thereof: ... Liability for baggage
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in the possession of any of the companies over which
thes·e tickets read whether same is checked or unchecked,
in transit or in storage, is limited to wearing apparel not
exceeding $100 in value for a whole ticket and $50 for
a half-ticket.' '' The conditions under which the baggage
was checked were stated on the railroad ticket and were
as follows: '' 'This company . . . assumes no liability
... on this ticket for baggage, except for wearing apparel
and then only for $100 in value, unless a contract in writing is made for greater value. ' '' This court held that
the regulations filed under the Interstate Commerce Act
are not applicable, and affirmed judgment for plaintiff
for the full amount of the articles lost. The court affirmed the lower court's refusal to admit in evidence the
conditions on the ticket and the aforesaid regulations.
"In any event, the effect to be given to those matters is
entirely for the court, and, although they had been expressly admitted in evidence, the result, so far as it
affected appellant's liability, would still have been the
same as a matter of law.'' The court held that the
ticket and the regulations "do not amount to an agreement such ·as will prevent the passenger from recovering
the full value of his baggage when lost through the negligence of the carrier, or through acts over which it
has control.'' Contrary to the impression received
from the brief of appellant in the instant case, this court,
as shown in the Homer case:
"Is committed to the doctrine that a common
carrier may limit its common law liability for loss
of property as an insurer. The proposition (as to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

I

I

I

31
negligence) is not involved in this case, and there-fore we do not decide whether a common carrier
may not under certain circumstances by an express or necessarily implied agreement, when
freely and fairly made, limit its liability for loss
of property, even though such loss be occasioned
through the ordinary negligence of the carrier or
through acts over which it has control." (Italics
ours).
The U. S. Supreme Court, in Oregon Short Line
Railroad vs. Homer', 235 U.S. 693, 59 L. Ed. 428, in a
per curiam decision, reversed the judgment and remanded the case "for futher proceedings upon authority of Boston and M. R. Co. vs. Roo1ker (supra). Therefore, we have a direct ruling by the U. S. Supreme Court
that the limitation of liability contained in the railroad's
tariff schedules, regulations and limitations does not
exclude any particular type of loss, be it one of negligence or conversion.
In Shay vs. U. Bac. R. Co., 47 Utah 252, 153 Pac. 31,
this court recognized the rule of the Bosto'YIA vs. RoDke'(r(
case, supra, and Bart vs. Pennsylvania, supra, and quoted
from the Hooker opinion as follows : '' '. . . Thus a
common carrier may by contract limit his liability for
certain purposes even as against his negligent acts or
the negligent acts of his servants . . . ' '' That decision
turned upon a set of facts different from our case, and
the specific wording of the bill of }ading is cotnsidered.
The court ruled that the limitation did not apply to a
loss such as suffered by plaintiff through the negligent
operation of defendant's train engine.
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Let us consider the decisions of still other jurisdiCtions upon our question. Arkansas holds that a flat limitation restricting a liability in a parcel check stub to a
specified amount is valid. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Fuqua,
233 S.W. 926. There the complaint asked for the value
of a suit case and its contents alleg·ed to have been destroyed through defendant's negligence in failing to remove it from the store room after discovering that its
depot was on fire. No federal statute was involved. Defendant answered that if plaintiff recover anything,
recovery should be limited to a maximum of $25, as
stipulated on the parcel check. There was no evidence
that the defendant had posted in its depot a notice of
limitation. The language on the parcel check read as
follows: ''The carrier will not be responsible for loss,
damage, or detention of articles left in storage for any
amount in excess of $25." The opinion is silent as to
whether plaintiff knew of the limitation. The plaintiff
contended that def.endant could not limit its liability
growing out of its own negligence. In answer, the court
stated that ''The contract is broad enough to limit appellant's liability on any account.... A warehouseman
may limit his liability to an agreed value of the article
l'·eceived where the rate charged was based upon the
value of the article. The court held for the railroad and
cited in support of its ruling the U. S. Supreme Oourt
case of K. C. 8. R. Co. v. Oarl, supra.
The above case of Missou-ri Pac. R. Co. v. Fuqwa was
recently approved by the same court in Miss!ouri Pac.
Transp. Co. v. Willia.ms, 182 S.W. 2d 762. The facts are
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about the san1e. The same type of limitation of liability
was written upon the parcel check given to plaintiff at
the time she checked her handbag at defendant's parcel
room. Plaintiff testified that she did not read the printed
words of the check, nor was her attention called to its
terms. Defendant's agent testified at the trial that
the loss of the bag occurred ''through the porter just
handing out too many bags to some person.'' The
limitation there is not one based on a declared value such
as is our case, where the shipper is given the option of
paying a higher rate for increased value. Nevertheless,
the court held the limitation valid, and reduced the lower
court judgment to $25, the amount of the limitation. The
court made no distinction because the fact that appellant's agent was negligent in delivering the baggage to
another person. "The purpose of the stipulation was to
limit its liability for negligence, not to exempt it entirely.'' The Williams decision, in support, quoted from
an Illinois case, Noyes v. Hines, 220 Ill. App. 409, as
follows:
"We think the weight of authority is to the
effect that when a person accepts a ticket from a
bailee in receipt for a parcel deposited with him,
he is bound by the terms and conditions of that
receipt in so far as he has reasonable notice of
the same, and in so far as the same are reasonable. In this case it does not seem to be unreasonable to hold that a person depositing luggage or
similar articles temporarily, in the manner as
shown by the evidence, and for a consideration of
only 10 cents to be paid by him, would expect that
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there would be some limitation pla0ed upon the
value of the article so deposited. If this were not
so then the defendant would have been bound if
plaintiff had deposited with his suit case $100,000
worth of diamonds or other articles of similar
great value. The condition, therefore, in itself,
seems to have been a reasonable one. The notice
as to the condition would also seem to have been
reasonable. The defendant had a right to assume
that the plaintiff could read the English language;
had also a right to assume that the plaintiff would
take notice that by reason of the very small
charge he could not expect an unlimited liability."
The abov·e language certainly fits our present case.
The appellant here would have this court allow him some
Two Thousand One Hundred and Ninety Dollars ($2,190.00) merely for the sum of 10 cents paid respondent,
and in the face of the parc-el check and posted notice
limitation which the lower court found to be visible to
defendant. There was nothing in the situation at the
time the hailn1ent was made to prevent appellant's stating the claimed value of the bag and its contents. llfis-

souri Pacific v. Williarms, decision, supra, cited with approval the Ohio case of Central Sto·nage W,arehouse Comparny v. Pickening, supra, to the effect that if such are-

ceipt limiting liability is given to the bailor, it" 'becomes
a contract between the parties and the person receiving
and holding such receipt even though he does not sign
the same or otherwise expressly assent to its terms and
conditions and is chargeable with knowledge of such
terms and conditions and is bound by the sam·e.... '"
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The annotation at 27 A.L.R. 57 lists an English case
upholding a parcel check limitation of liability. In
Gibarud v. Great Eastern R. Co., 2 K. B. (Eng.) 426,
plaintiff sued for the loss of his bicycle left at the defendant's office. He was given a receipt limiting liability
to a specific amount " 'unless at the time of deposit the
true value and nature of the article shall have been declared' '', and an increased charge paid according to the
added value. The court held the limitation reasonable
even though it protected the defendant company from its
own negligence. " 'Particularly in a case where it is
eminently reasonable that they should ·be. protectedif the man who deposits property of large value has not
taken the trouble to pay the company for the excess
in value of the property which he is leaving with them.' ''
The other decisions, cited in the above A.L.R. annotation, and which appear at first glance to take the opposite view, are concerned with fixed limitations of liability, not based upon any declared value and the option
of paying an increased charge.
Appellant's brief at Page 19 quotes from A'f!l'erican
Jurispntdence in support of appellant's proposition that
our type of limitation of liability is invalid. That quotation is not at all in point. A statement from the same
authority appearing elsewhere is proof of this. In Vol.
10 .Am. Jur. 454 the general rule is giv:en:
"1749. LIMITATIONS AS TO AMOUNT'
OF LIABILITY OR VALUE OF BAGGAGE.
According to the great weight of authority, a common carrier of passengers may make reasonable
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stipulations as to the value of baggage intrusted
to it by a passenger or make reasonable limitations as to the amount for which it shall be liable
in case of the loss of a passenger's baggage,
which will bind the passenger, even though the
loss results from the carrier's negligence, although
there are some decisions expressive of a contrary
view.''
Vol. 7 A.L.R. Page 1234 summarizes the decisions pertaining to limitations of carrier's liability in respect to
baggage checked in a parcel room.
''III. Effect of Clause or Notice Limiting
Liability. The majority of cases hold that, while
a carrier who accepts baggage in its parcel room
on payment of a fee is liable for ordinary negligence, the bailor or depositor is presumed to have
knowledge of a condition or stipulation printed
on the duplicate parcel check, limiting the carrier's liability to a sum stated thereon, and is
bound by the provisions printed on the check.''
The annotation cites and summarizes a number of English decisions in accord, some of which involve a fixed
limitat.lon where there is no charge based upon declared
value. Also cited is the South Carolina case of Ter.ry
v. Southern R. Oo., 62 S.E. 249, where the plaintiff
checked a suit case at defendant's parcel room and received therefor·e a receipt which had upon it a printed
stipulation providing that: " 'In consideration of the
low rate at which it is issued, no clalim in excess of $10
shall be made against the railroad company for loss of or
injury to any package, valise, or other article which may
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have been deposited with it, (the railroad company) and
for which this ticket has been issued.' ''
The bag was lost !hrough defendant's negligence. The
court stated that the defendant, in accepting parcels and
bags for deposit at its station, was not acting as a common carrier but as a warehouseman, and that,'' As such
warehouseman . . . it had a right to contract for the
limitation of the amount of its liability in case of loss,
and the receipt expressing such limitation was binding
on the owner of the goods.''
III.
APPELLANT'S POINT III CONCERNING ACCEPTANCE PRESENTS A QUESTION NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, AND IS CONTRARY TO THE WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY.
In addition to the foregoing argument, respondent
would like to further answer appellant's point III, wherein he contends not only that he must have accepted the
"offer of defendant" to limit its liability, but that no
such acceptance is shown. The authorities presented
above by respondent prove the rule to be that the question of acceptance is one of fact for the trial court, and
subordinate to the ultimate finding of an agreement or
contract. As stated in French v. Bekin8 Moving & Storag,e, supra, the finding "that the defendant was 'liable
upon a contractual limitation of ten cents per pound,'
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ingly assent to the ten cent limitation, and supports that
finding.''
Furthermore, in our instant ease, the lower court's
findings are not inconsistent with the fact of appellant's
acceptance, or assent, as those terms are used in contract law. Mere acceptance and use of the claim check
and receipt is, in the absence of unusual circumstances
amounting to bad faith or unfair advantage by a bailee,}
held by the majority of courts to amount to acceptance
of the receipt's terms, and the failure of the bailor to
read or learn of the stipulation is of no avail to him. See
Boston & M,ain R. R. v. Ho,oker, supra; Normile v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., supra; Central Warehouse v. Pickering, supra; ~and Mo. Pac. Trans. Co. v. Will~ams, supra,
also 7 A.L.R. 1234, supra. The lower court found that defendant gave appellant, Allen, a receipt, or parcel check,
and that he kept it and later presented it to defendant.
Here we have the finding that defendant had its notice
of limitation posted "where it was visible to- plaintiff
as he cheeked his said bag. . . . '' The court made no
finding that Allen did not accept the limitation provisions, or that he objected to them, or declared a value
for his bag or contents. The court's finding that Allen
did not read or see the notice, or know of any limitation,
and that defendant did not ''advise'' plaintiff of, or call
plaintiff's attention to, the said limitation provisions,
does not preclude the existence of acceptance or assent
implied from the circumstances. That such acceptance .
existed is exactly the inference to he drawn from the
court's finding that a contract was formed. To adopt
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appellant's argument \vould defeat most contractual obligations now upheld by the courts, and would make the
carrier an easy victim of fraudulent schemes. Failure
to read or know what an agreement contains, or failure
of one party to advise the other of the terms, is not,
for very sotmd reasons, a defense to a suit upon a contract. This salutary rule should govern no less in the
situation now before the court. Respondent again submits, however, upon the authorities presented above in
its argument, that this court, without the record before it, cannot look behind the finding of the lower court
that a contract existed, and determine whether or not
Allen accepted the limitation. See the case of Lebkeucher
v. Pa. R. Co., (N. J.) 116 A, 323, quoted in appellant's
brief, where the court considered as final the lower
court's finding of no acceptance, no duty to take notice·
of the receipt and placard, and no contract.
IV.
POINT IV OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF AS TO
CONVERSION HAS NO SUPPORT IN LAW OR IN
FACT.
Appellant would have this court find that the terms
of the contract did not cover the present situation: that
the word "loss" in the limitation did not include "conversion.'' In the first place, the lower court made no
finding of a conversion of plaintiff's bag. Appellant has
constructed this idea from the court's finding" That the
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defendant did not take due care of or safely keep the
goods of the plaintiff, nor did it, when requested, return
or redeliver the same to the plaintiff, but, on the contrary, defendant deliv-ered said bag, together with the.
contents therein, to some person or persons unknown to
the plaintiff, and that in so doing, the bag and its contents were wholly lost to the plaintiff." Respondent submits that the court's finding that "the defendant did
not take due care of or safely keep the goods of plaintiff,'' amounts to a finding of negligence only, and that
no finding was made that respondent intentionally delivered the bag to another person or converted it to its
own use. The respondent further submits that the lower
court's determination after considering all of the evidence, that a contract was formed between the parties
limiting liability in this particular case, is a finding which
is conclusive upon this court, and the question whether
the limitation covered the loss of plaintiff's bag is not
subject- to review. Appellant's own cited cas·e of Lebkeucher v. Pa. R. Co., supra, is authority for this point.
That such a situation as ours does not amount to a
conversion is held in the recent case of GBorrge e~t al v.

Bekins Van & Storog·e Co., et al, supra. The California
court summarized the law as follows:
''The tort of conv.ersion exists if there is
an exertion of wrongful dominion over the personal property of another in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein. Zaslow v. Kroenert, 29 Cal. 2d 541, 549, 176 P. 2d 1; Gruber v.
Pacific States Sav. & Loan Co., 13 Cal. 2d 144,
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1-18, 88 P. 2d 137; see, Prosser on Torts, p. 95.
The tort is committed when a bailee having the
power to do so refuses to redeliver goods to which
the bailor is entitled.... If redelivery is impossible, however, because the goods have been lost
or destroyed, either without fault on the part
of the bailee or merely because of his negligence,
there is no conversion. Negligence in caring for
the goods is not an act of dominion over them
such as is necessary to make the bailee liable as
a converter."
The Restatement of Torts, Vol. I, Sections 235
through 237, is directly contrary to appellant's argument
that the loss of his bag amounted to a conversion. Section 237 (d) states the following rule:
''d. The refusal to surrender a chattel upon
demand is not a conversion if the person upon
whom the demand is made does not have possession of the chattel at the time of the demand. If
the goods have been disposed of or intentionally
destroyed, either properly or improperly, the
actor is not liable for his refusal to surrender
them. . . . So, too, if the goods have been lost,
harmed or destroyed through the negligence of
the person in possession, whether such negligence
consists of active misconduct or a failure to perform acts which it was his duty to perform, such
person may be liable for his negligence, but he
is not liable for a conversion under the rule stated
in this Section.' '
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that defendant was guilty of such conversion, none of the decisions
of the U. S. Supreme Court, or of Oregon, or California,
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or most other jurisdictions, make any distinction between conversion and loss of bailed goods by other means.
In Georg ia, Florida, & Alab·ama R:ailway Compamty v.
Blish Milling Compam;y, 241 U.S. 190, 60 L. Ed. 948, the
Supreme Court held:
1

''The effect of a stipulation in a bill of lading for an interstate shipment r·equiring claims
for damages or misdelivery to be presented within four months after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed cannot be avoided by suing
the carrier in trover on the theory that in making
the misdelivery it converted the shipment, and
thus abandoned the contract, since the parties
could not waive the terms of the contract under
which the shipment was made ... nor could the
carrier by its conduct give the shipper the right
to ignore the terms and hold the carrier to a
different responsibility from that fixed by the
agreement made under the published tariffs and
regulations.''
Again, in Homer v. R. R., supra, the U.S. Supreme
Court held a baggage loss limitation valid in a case where
plaintiff expressly alleged in her complaint that the defendant failed to ex·ercise reasonable care in keeping the
goods, and wrongfully delivered the same to some person or persons unknown to plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
in R·ailway E:v,press Agency, Inc., v. Marcha;n;t Calculating M·ach. Co., 52 Atl. 2d 277, decided an action wherein
plaintiff sought recovery of goods shipped by the defendant, which shipment was covered by the Interstate
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Commerce Act. In holding the shipper bound by the
limitation stated in the express receipt, the court commented:
'·Federal law will not permit the limitation .
. to be escaped by local law or decision that unexplained failure to deliver establishes conversion ... Under federal law, failure to deliver is
not a 'conYersion' . . . \\1hether the loss in the
case before us resulted from conversion by the
... employee (defendants) or from negligence of
the employe, our conclusion is that the limitation
of liability based on the declared value of the lost
article ... is effective .... ''
The Ohio court, in Cent~al Stor,age Warehouse Company v. Pickering, supra, held a limitation of liability
in a warehouse receipt valid where plaintiff's suit was
in trover for conversion of the goods. This case was
cited and quoted in the above Oregon case of V oyt V'.
Bekins J.lLoving & Storage Co., supra, without any indication that a distinction should be made between conversion and other types of loss.
Appellant's contention as to loss by conversion is.
further destroyed by the wording of and the decisions
upon the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, which was in
effect in Oregon when appellant's bailment and loss occurred. That act refers to ''any loss or injury to the
goods caused by his (warehouseman's) failure to exercise such care," etc. 4 0. C. L. A. Sec. 60-221. Decisions
under this act make no distinction where loss occurs by
conversion. See Voyt v. Be'Mins Moving & Storage, (Ore.)
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supra; George v. Bekins, (Cal.) supra; Central Storage
W·a.rehouse Co. v. Pickering, (Ohio), supra.
It is beyond reason that the ins·ertion of the word
''loss'' in the legislative acts, or in the limitation now
before the court, was made with the intent of excluding
trover. Many losses by bailees would not be covered.
The word "loss" means loss by any means. Appellant
would make an exception where none appears. As stated
by the Arkansas court, in Mo. Rae. R. Co. v. Fuqwa,
supra, the words '' 'loss, damage, or detention of articles left in storage' ", appearing on the receipt, are
"broad enough to limit appellant's liability on any account."

v.
CASES CITED BY AP:eELLANT
Respondent, after considerable search, has been unable to find one decision cited in appellant's brief which
is concerned with a limitation of liability, such as ours,
based upon a sliding scale of charges tied to the declared
value of the bailed property. Respondent's argument
here has shown that that is exactly the distinction drawn
in most courts. Many of appellant's cases, moreover,
are directly opposed to his contention that limitations of
liability are contrary to public policy. Jones v. Great
N;orthern R1ailway Compan;y, 217 Pac. 673; Lebkeucher v.
Pennsylvamia Railway Comparny, 116 A. 323. Appellant's
decisions are, for the most part, cases in which the whole
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record, including the testimony, was before the reviewing court and, therefore, it passed upon the question
whether a contract was formed. D·enver Unlion Terminal
Ry. Co. v. Cullina.n, 210 Pac. 602. In our case, the lower
court has so found and no transcript is before this
court to enable it to review that question.
The Oregon case of Pilson v. Tip-Top Auto Company, 136 Pac. 6-!2, quoted by appellant, involved only
an alleged oral agreement between the parties whereby
''defendant assumed no liability whatever for the safety,
preservation, or" redelivery (of the property) save only
as against its own willful and intentional misconduct.''
Appellant also advances in sup~ort of his argument the
Ohio case of Agricultural Insurance Company v. Con-stantine, 58 N. E. 2d. 658. There, the court considered an
exemption and loss of a car "''from whatev·er cause arising," and is obviously not in point. Central Storage
Warehouse Corrnpo;ny v. Pickering, supra, is still the
present rule in Ohio. The California case of England v.
Lyons Firepro1of Storage Co., presented in appellant's
brief as authority for his proposition that a limitation
of liability is contrary to public policy, expressly held
that the limitation is valid where the bailee does not
know the value of the goods. The very recent California
case of George v. Bekins Moving & St:orrage Co., supra,
quoted above by respondent, expressly disapproves that
part of the Lyons decision ruling voiding the limitation
where the bailee knows the value, and, therefore, removes any support that decision might have given appellant.
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A reading of the Montana case of Jones v. Great
Northern Railiro·ad Company, supra, quoted extensively
and put forth by appellant as direct authority for his
proposition that the limitation must have been accepted
by appellant, reveals that the decision is concerned with
a fixed liability set by defendant " 'not to exceed
$10.00' ''. Furthermore, the defendant did not have a
sign posted near the check room giving notice of any limitation. The Montana court concedes that plaintiff may
be bound by the limitation provision ''if his course of
conduct is such as to ' lead the bailee, as a reasonable
person, to believe that he assents to the provision; and
the mere fact that he retains the check without objection
does not, as a matter of law, constitute such conduct,
and in the absence of notice from the ba:ilee ... the bailor
is not under legal duty to read whatever inscription may
be upon it." In our own case, the only logical deduction
from the lower court's conclusion that a contract existed
is that the court found that plaintiff had sufficient notice
of the limitation to bind him. In Lebkeucher v. Fa. R. Oo·.,
supra, quoted by appellant, the lower court made a finding of fact that the receipts and placard did not make a
contract limiting defendant's liability. Here we have the
reverse situation. The Denver Union Terminal Ry. Co. v.
Cullinan case, supra, stressed by appellant, involved only
a fixed limitation of liability regardless of value, as did
appellant's case of Fessle;r v. Detroit Taxioab & Transfer Comp(]ffby, 171 N.W. 360. In the latter case, the
Michigan court cited D'Ut,assy v. Barrett, 157 N.Y. Supp.
916, 114 N.E. 786, in which a bill of lading provided that,
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" 'In consideration of the rate charged for carrying
said property, which is regulated by the value thereof,
. . . the shipper agrees that the company shall not be
liable in any event for more than fifty dollars' '', etc.
This situation is, states the Michigan court, "clearly a
Yery different case than the one before us.'' And so
''ith us, the facts of our case present a situation quite
different from that contained in appellant's decisions.,
Respondent again emphasizes that appellant has not
presented one decision which is in point for his argu-:
ments, or is opposed to this respondent's position.
CONCLUSION
The type of limitation contract now before this court
is upheld by the highest court of the United States, by
many other tribunals, and by the highest court of Oregon,
the place where the contract was made and the loss occurred. Such a limitation, based as it is upon a varying
charge to the. bailee dependent upon the declared value,
is not contrary to public policy in Oregon or elsewhere,
whether the loss occurs through a conversion of the
property, negligence of the bailee, or misdelivery to
another person. The limitation of value contract between this appellant and respondent covered the very
loss that the court found took place.
The determination by the lower court that the extent of respondent's liability was by contract limited to
a certain amount is in truth a finding which, in the absence of the transcript of testimony, is not subject to
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review. If it were, however, here open to redetermination, the issues raised by the pleadings, and the findings
and conclusions o.f the lower court, together with the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, support
the judgment.
Respondent respectfully submits, upon the record
now before this court and upon the fully qualified authorities above presented, that the judgment appealed from
should be affirmed.

CROSS ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

I.
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
SUSTAINING APPELLANT'S GENERAL DEMURRER TO RESPONDENT'S FIRST ANSWER.
Rule VIII of this court permits respondent to assign
cross-errors in his brief. This court has held that such
assignments are permissible without a cross -appeal
where the respondent does not seek reversal or modification of the judgment. San Pedr-o, etc., R. R. v. Board ,of
Education, 35 Utah 13, 99 Pac. 263. Respondent submits that the lower court was in error when it sustained
plaintiff's (appellant's) general demurrer to the affirmative defense set forth in paragraph 5 of respondent's
first answer. The demurrer was upon the ground that
the so-called affirmative defense set forth in Paragraph
(5) of defendant's said original Answer does not state
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facts sufficient to constitute a defense to plaintiff's cause
of action. In that answer, respondent set forth that any
''delivery and deposit were subject to the Regulations
Governing Parcel Checking Charges, issued by defendant and filed in Book 1, Section 7 of defendant's Passenger Tariff File, as authorized and required by the
Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act, being Title 49 U. S. C. A. No. 20;
that said Regulations limited defendant's liability to
$25.00 for any loss or damage to any parcel unless, at
the time such parcel was checked with defendant a
greater value was declared and paid for at the rates set
out in said Regulation.'' After setting forth the form
and terms of the parcel check and posted notice, the
said answer further alleged that ''the said regulations,
notice, and parcef checks gave notice at all times named
in plaintiff's complaint that defendant would not accept
any parcel valued in excess of $250.00" and tliat plaintiff did not make any declaration of value or pay an
additional charge.
The Federal statute which respondent believes
should apply is 49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 20 (11). After providing that no contract or regulation shall exempt a
cbmmon carrier or transportation company from full
liability, it reads as follows:
''That the provisions hereof respecting liability for full actual loss, damage, or injury,
notwithstanding any limitation of liability or recovery or representation or agreement or release
as to value, and declaring any such limitation to
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be unlawful and void, shall not apply, first, to
baggage carried on passenger trains or boats,
or trains or boats carrying passengers; second, to
property, except ordinary livestock, received for
transportation concerning which the carrier shall
have been or shall be expressly authorized or required by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish and maintain rates dependent upon the value declared in writing by the
shipper or agreed upon in writing as the released
value of the property, in which case such declaration or agreement shall have no other effect
than to limit liability and recovery to an amount
not exceeding the value so declared or released,
and shall not, so far as relates to values, be held
to be a violation of section 10 of this chapter;
and any tariff schedule which may be filed with
the commission pursuant to such order shall contain specific reference thereto and may establish rates varying with the value so declared or
agreed upon ; and the commission is empowered
to make such order in cases where rates dependent upon and varying with declared or agreed
values would, in its opinion, be just and reasonable under the circumstances and conditions surrounding the transportation.''
Respondent has been unable to find any court decision
for or against the application of this statute to a parcel
check stand bailment. It appears to respondent however,
that the baggage room cases are sufficiently analogous
to be authority for placing our case, and respondent's
first answer, under the above Interstate Commerce Act.
Respondent here maintains that it was entitled to show
facts to place it within the statute, such as the interstate
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nature of the plaintiff's trip and of the transportation
and deposit of the bag. The ruling of the lower court
on the demurrer denied respondent that right.
The U. S. 'Supreme Court holds that baggage is in
interstate con1n1erce if it is to move or the passenger,
by his ticket, is to n1ove in another state. That court
further holds that the rules of the Interstate Commerce
Commission apply where rates are based on value pursuant to authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission. Lancaster v. McCarty, 267 U. S. 427, 69 L. Ed.
696.
As respondent's argument has heretofore indicated,
the courts apply the said federal statute where the goods
are lost while resting in the carrier's station. See
Homer v. Railr:oad, supra. Further, the Supreme Court
holds that the valuation limitation of the carrier's schedules ''automatically attached'' if the shipper did not
declare the value. Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, supra.
It must be remembered that the above cited Commerce
Act also provides :
''The schedules printed as aforesaid by any
such common carrier shall plainly state the places
between which property and passengers will be
carried, and shall contain the classification of
freight in force, and shall also state separately
all terminal charges, storage charges, icing
charges, and all other charges which the commission may require, all privileges or facilities
granted or allowed and any rules or regulations
which in any wise change, affect, or determine
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any part or the aggregate of such aforesaid rates,
fares, and charges, or the value of the service
rendered to the passenger, shipper, or consignee.
Such schedules shall ·be plainly printed in large
type, and copies for the use of the public shall be
kept posted in two public and conspicuous places
in every depot, station, or office of such carrier
where passengers or freight, respectively, are
received for transportation, in such form that
they shall be accessible to the public and can be
conveniently inspected.''
49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6, par. (1).
As the Supreme Court said, in Boston & M. R. Co.
v. Hooker, supra, in referring to this section:

''It seems to us that the ordinary signification
of the terms used in the act would cover such requirements as are here made for the amount of
recovery for baggage lost by the carrier. It is a
regulation which fixes and determines the amount
to be charged for the carriage in view of the responsibility assumed, and it also affects the value
of the service rendered to the passenger. Such
requirements are spoken of, in decisions dealing
with them, as regulations; as, a common carrier
'may prescribe rei(Julations to protect himself
against imposition and fraud, and fix a rate of
charges proportionate to the magnitude of the
risks he may have to encounter.' "
In our case, the use of the check stand was a facility
furnished the public and plaintiff in connection with the
respondent's transportation services.
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The Supreme Court later considered a baggage loss
case where the state court refused to consider the rate
schedules filed under the Interstate Commerce Act because not certified. The state court held the carrier to
the full value of the goods. The Supreme Court declared :
"In order to determine the liability assumed
for baggage it was proper to consider applicable
tariff schedules on file with the Interstate Conlmerce Commission; and the carrier had a Federal
right not only to a fair opportunity to put these
in evidence, but also that, when before the court,
they should be given due consideration ... After
their admission in evidence by the trial court the
schedules could not be disregarded arbitrarily
without denying the railroad's Federal right; and
we think they were so treated by the court of appeals. We are cited to no decision of the supreme
court of Missouri recognizing any settled rule of
practice there which required such action, and the
unjust consequences of it are apparent. Assuming,
without deciding, the correctness of its opinion
that the schedules as certified were inadmissible
and improperly received, nevertheless the court
should not have destroyed the carrier's opportunity to protect itself by introducing other evidence upon a new trial.''

N. Y. Central R. R. Co. v. Beham, 242 U. S. 148, 61
L. Ed. 210.
The Supreme Court of Alabama, in a well reasoned
and extensive opinion, held that the plaintiff was limited
in his recovery to the sum of $25 as set forth in the
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baggage check which she received from the porter. Birmingham Teff'minal Co. v. Wilson, 31 So. 563. The lower
court had refused to admit in evidence "Local and Joint
Passenger Carrier Tariff'' regulations, certified by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The hand bag in question was lost after being delivered to the defendant's
redcap by plaintiff upon alighting from the train. The
claim check provided that a greater value could be declared in writing, and coverage was given upon payment
of an additional charge for each hundred dollars in value
''but not to exceed the total value of $500. '' The above
Tariff Regulation provided this same limitation for redcap service. Plaintiff contended that the word "baggage'' as set forth in the Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U. S. C. A. Section 20 (11) means property checked for
transportation ''as incidental to passenger carriage and
not to hand baggage carried with the person of the passenger." The court rejected this argument, and held
that the federal law applied. Concerning the validity
of the limitation, the decision observed:
''But it has been consistently held that valuation agreements may be sustained without the
aid of a statute on principles of estoppel and in
carefully restricted cases where choice of rates
was given, and where the rate was tied to the release.'' (Citing U. S. Supreme Court and other
decisions).
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The opinion cited the California decision of Franklin v.
So·u.tkern Pacific Railroad, 265 Pac. 936, which held that
the Interstate Commerce Act applied to redcap porter
service. The Alabruna court quoted from this California
decision as follows :
''We can think of no reason why there should
be any difference between baggage in the custody
of a porter as a servant of the carrier, and lost
through his negligence, and baggage in the custody of a baggageman, likewise a servant of the
carrier, and lost through his negligence.''
The court made the following comment, which appears
to respondent to be particular]y in point in our own case :
''But the tariff and regulation filed in respect to the instant case apply expressly to red
cap service and to a passenger's hand baggage,
and contain a choice of rates affected hy declared
valuations.''
Here, respondent's answer expressly alleged that
the tariff schedules filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission limited appellant's liability and showed that
such regulations contained a choice of rates.
Upon the above authorities, respondent submits that
the lower court committed error in sustaining plaintiff's
general demurrer to the affirmative defense set out in
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tion involves so much public interes,t, and is of such la~t
ing importance, respondent now requests this court to
pass upon it.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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WILLIAM J. O'CONNOR, JR.

\

Attorneys for Defendant ,and
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